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                                                                Abstract 
 
Using a firm-level survey database covering 50 countries we evaluate firms´ abnormal retained earnings. The 
results of our work indicate that firms located in emerging markets retain more earnings than firms from 
developed countries. On the other hand, firms located on common law based countries retain earnings above 
the expected and higher than firms placed on civil law based countries. A possible explanation, according to 
our results, can be seen in the economic growth that these countries have shown in the past 20 years. The 
financial crisis of 2008 and its impact in the abnormal retained earnings can help to validate this result. Finally , 
we would like to draw attention upon the impact of the firms´ size on abnormal retained earnings. According 
to our results this relationship is positive. This strongly questions the growth of smaller companies. 
 
 
JEL classification: G32; G38 
Keywords: Abnormal retained earnings; Financing choices; Institutional environment;  Small firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last twenty years, capital markets and financial systems have shown successive crises . The burst of the 
dotcom in the beginning of the century, the subprime crisis and the sovereign debt crisis had a generalized  
impact. At the same time some developed countries, namely Greece, Italy and Portugal, registered a low 
growth, with their capital markets being affected by this situation. With the confidence crisis in the financial 
markets and with the economic instability, it was expected that companies would make an effort to retain 
results. This did not happen probably due to the fact of shareholders, with the help of management, preferred  
to have immediate dividends instead of waiting for future profits.  
Even though the modern debate about the choices for financing companies is nearly 60 years old, this 
work has some pioneering particularities. Until the 80s decade, the focus of analysis centered on topics related 
to the tax shield, together with the bankruptcy and agency costs and with the problems of information 
asymmetry, creating two currents, the trade off theory and the pecking order theory. In the last thirty years the 
empirical adherence of the two theories has been discussed for the financing of co mpanies, with different  
results (Frank and Goyal (2005) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). At the same time, during the last 
twenty years, while researchers tried to evaluate the role of both theories with the aid of the companies  features, 
they were equally analysing the institutional factors that could influence the financing of the companies . This 
is to say what role they play regarding the decisions of financing,  namely the legal origin (civil or common), 
the rule of law, the corruption perception, the protection of the rights of the shareholders and creditors, the 
financial architecture of the country (banking or capital market based), among other aspects  (Alves and Ferreira 
(2011), Booth et al (2001), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996, 1998, 1999), Giannetti (2003), De Jong et 
al (2008), Fan et al (2012) and Öztekin (2015)). Recently, corporate finance also focused on another issue 
related with financial coporate financing decisions and with the decision to retain earnings, the cash holding 
decisions (Opler et al (1999) Dittmar et al (2003) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004)), According to their results 
cash holdings decisions can be explained by the trade off theory, the pecking order theory and the free cash 
flow theory of Jensen (1986). In fact the purposes of abnormal retained earnings can be similar to corporate 
cash holdings and both can be explained by trade off theory, i. e., to reduce the cost of financial dis tress and to 
minimise the cost of external funds. The pecking order theory can also support both topics. It postulates that 
funds internally generated are less costly, contrarilry to risky debt and particularly equity, the most expensive 
source of financing. The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) can also influence abnormal retained earnings 
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and cash holdings once the excess of cash can be used by managers in their own interests, but not in the interests 
of shareholders.    
The main motivation of this work, which is based on pioneer approach, abnormal retained earnings, 
is to open the gateways to a matter that has not been largely discussed in comparison with external financing, 
the internal financing, the main source of funding used by companies. Internal financing is an important topic 
once the typical firm has many difficulties to obtain external funds. Such is more plausible for firms with  
financial constraints, namely the small ones, and we know they are the most common in all economies and 
how they participate on countries´ growth. The relationship between financing constraints and corporate 
investment was firstly debated by Fazzari et al (1988), having them concluded that firms with high degree of 
financing constraints present a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow, i. e., cash flow is an important  
determinant of marginal capital spending for constrained firms when external funds  are  costly. Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) concluded that cash flow is not the ideal measure to identify the differencial cost between 
internal and external finance. Their findings point out that less constrained firms´ exhibit significantly greater 
investment cash flow sensitivity than more financially constrained firms. This issue is particularly relevant in 
recession periods or in epochs of financial crisis since the investors present much more risk aversion. It is also 
related with the findings of Graham and Harvey (2001), i. e., CFOs are continually trying to find out financing 
sources that allow firms to have financial flexibility in face of credit constraints and capital market  
devaluations, and with the precautionary motive to hold cash, defended by Keynes (1936), in order to hedge 
against future cash shortfall.  
The main goal of this research is to examine which firms (including countries and financial 
infrastructures) presented higher abnormal retained earnings.  
Our findings indicate that firms placed on emerging markets use more internal financing than firms  
of developed countries. The same cannot be said about common law based countries towards civil law based 
ones, where the first generally present larger financial infrastructures. In these countries, despite of having an 
easier access to external financing, firms retain earnings above the expected and higher than civil law based 
countries. A possible explanation, according to our results, can be seen in the economic growth that these 
countries have shown in the past 20 years. The financial crisis of 2008 and its impact in the abnormal retained 
earnings can help to validate partially this result.  
Concerning the determinants of abnormal retained earnings our results show a consensual role of fir m-
level variables in comparison to country-level variables. In this regard, we would like to draw attention upon 
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the impact of the firms´ size on abnormal retained earnings. According to our results this relationship is 
positive. This strongly questions the growth of smaller companies. Despite their financial constraints in terms  
of external finance they present lower abnormal retained earnings. It is a matter that deserves definitely more 
in-depth research in the future.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hypothesis development, the data, and the 
methodology. Section 3 details the main results. Section 4 presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Related literature, testable hypothesis and methodology 
 
2.1. Related literature and testable hypothesis  
 
This section analyses the role of recent financial crisis and financial infraestructures on abnormal retained 
earnings.  This is an effort that includes different debates on corporate finance, namely financing choices, cash 
holdings, financing constraints and corporate investment, among others. The variables used as determinants of 
abnormal retained earnings reflect different financing choices perspectives (pecking order theory, trade off 
theory, agency theory and financial flexibility theory).  
We use different firm-variables as determinants of abnormal retained earnings. A firm that currently 
does not pay dividends raise their funds on capital markets at higher cost, contrarily to a firm that often pays 
dividends. But moreover, the dividends payment may help to reduce the tradicional agency problem between 
managers and shareholders by reducing the amount of cash disposable by executives in their own interest 
(Jensen (1986)). Thus, a negative relationship between dividend payments and retained earnings is expected.  
On the other hand, a firm that increases easily their leverage present lower problems on matter of information  
asymmetry (Myers (1984)) and need to retain less earnings for precautionary motive (Keynes (1936)). An 
expected negative relationship between leverage and abnormal retained earnings is also expected. Concerning 
to industry risk, a firm that works on a sector based on higher volatility of earnings before interest and taxes is 
riskier but expectably more profitable. In this case, it is expectable the use of retained earnings by firms , 
exploring the possibility of having the cheapest funding source. It is also generally accepted that larger firms  
present more diversified portfolios and lower probability of being in financial distress (Warner (1977) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)), encorouging large firms to hold less cash. But moreover, some financial literature 
has concluded that small firms present higher financial constraints and consequently use less external finance 
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(Beck et al (2005, 2008) and Audretsch and Elston (2002)). However, a firm retain more earnings to reinvest 
in a current and future projects if it is well succeeded (MacAnBhaird and Lucey (2010)). In fact, earnings 
retainment is the cheapest way of financing for firm´s growth, but such only occurs if a firm is well succeeded. 
Myers (1977) argues that shareholders of firms with growth potential (high market-to-book) tend to underinvest 
in their firms once the positive NPV of the projets is usually appropriated by bondholders. In that sense, holding 
cash should be the way chosen to not refuse the project´s development. 
Diverse recent research evaluated the impact of recent financial crises on firms´ capital structure. In 
general, the results show that debt maturity and firm leverage was reduced after a financial crisis (Voutsinas 
and Werner (2011), Akbar et al (2012) and Demirguc-Kunt et al (2015)). Firms substituted long term debt by 
short term debt, reacting to the rise of uncertainty and risk. The term premium requested by lenders increased 
during the crisis which made short term debt more attractive than long term debt from their point of view 
(Gurkaynak and Wright (2012) and Dick et al (2013). Facing financial constraints, with barriers to access to 
the capital markets it is predictable that firms hold more cash than expected. In fact in the beginning of the 
century, Graham and Harvey (2001) introduced a new debate about financing choices that can help us to 
fundament the hypothesis about the relationship between abnormal retained earnings and financial crisis, the 
financial flexibility: an impressive number of CFO´s declared that their financial decisions are based in 
response to uncertainty contingencies or a firm’s ability to access financing at a low cost and respond to 
unexpected changes in the firm’s cash flows or investment opportunities in a timely manner. In fact, Campello  
et al (2010) and Dunchin et al (2010) showed that during the financial crisis, firms generally were more 
financially constrained.  
H1:  Firms raise more abnormal retained earnings after the financial crises. 
Financial literature shows how important the legal system is for financial development (La Porta et al 
(1998, 1999) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)) and how firms operating in countries where 
financial claimants are more protected (common-law based countries) tend to have capital structures with more 
equity and long-term debt (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Fan et al (2012)) and probably need 
to retain less earnings, given the opportunities to obtain external funds. Thus, a negative relatio nship between 
financial development (capital market development and banking development) and retained earnings seems to 
exist.  
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H2: Firms present less abnormal retained earnings after capital market development and banking 
development 
Firms always need cash to fund ongoing operations, particularly when economies are growing. 
Probably, in face of financial needs, they need to raise funds to finance investments using simultaneously 
internal and external funds even if this means giving up a degree of control. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) showed 
that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is the highest for firms which seem to be the least financially 
constrained. Thus, the more the earnings are retained by firms, the more firms invest and that occurs particularly 
for firms less financial constrained, and particularly when economies are growing.  
H3:  Firms present more abnormal retained earnings after economic growth. 
 
2.2.  Methodology 
 
Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope  data item WC 01651) 
plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) 
and cash dividends paid (WC 04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). 
Abnormal retained earnings are obtained based on the methodology employed by Brown and Warner 
(1985) and Barber and Lyon (1996). Basically firms´ abnormal retained earnings compares realized retained 
earnings with its expected value. The expected retained earnings is the firms´ annual average retained earnings 
by sector. The sample is divided considering the super sectors from industrial classification benchmark (ICB), 
that is, 16 sectors. By joining firms from the same sector but located in different countries we intended to build 
a variable that properly reflected the global systematic risk. 
The expected retained earnings of firm i in year t, is the firms´ average retained earnings in year t from the 
sector j where firm i operates: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡  
 
 
The abnormal retained earnings of firm i in year t, 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 , is realized retained earnings 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 , less 
expected retained earnings, 𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡 ): 
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𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡 ) 
 
To test the null hypothesis, in which average abnormal retained earnings is equal for a sample n, we 
employ a parametric test s tatistic:  
t = 
𝐴𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑆´ (𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 )/√𝑛
 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the firms´ average abnormal retained earnings by country and 𝑆´ (𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) is the cross-
sectional sample standard deviation of abnormal retained earnings for a sample of n firms from a specific 
country. 
Following, a comparison among countries with different characteristics is done - emerging vs 
developed capital markets and civil vs common law based countries -, as well as, the impact of 2008 crisis on 
abnormal retained earnings. We intend to find some signs about the impact of financial system infrastructure 
(law, creditor and shareholder rights, banking based, capital market based, among others) and recent financial 
crisis on abnormal retained earnings. 
Finally, the last piece of this research dedicates to evaluate the determinants of abnormal retained 
earnings. Firstly, we compare the results considering a panel with random and fixed firm effects. Secondly, we 
adopt a dynamic panel model through generalized method of moments  estimator, developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). For that purpose we calculate dependent and independent variables by country, that is, the 
variables are obtained in a yearly basis by country. To build such variables a country should have at least 30 
firms on a specific year. Thus, we have an unbalanced panel of 862 observations. A balanced panel would have 
1.000 observations (50 countries times 20 years). Both et al (2001) used a similar approach to evaluate the 
influence of institutional variables on capital structure choice.  We also take into consideration a dynamic panel 
data considering all firms and using the same approach, but, in general, the models are overidentified. These 
approaches help us to evaluate which are the main determinants of abnormal retained earnings. The model 
posts the following relationship between abnormal retained earnings and its determinants: 
 
AREk ,t = β0 + (1-α) AREk,t−1+ βXk ,t + λ𝑘 + 𝛾𝑡  + μ k,t 
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where AREk ,t denotes the firms´ average abnormal retained earnings of country k on year t;  β0 is the 
contant; Xk ,t represents a vector of exogenous explanatory variables; α and β are parameters to be 
estimated, λ𝑘 represents time-invariant unobservable country-specific effects; 𝛾𝑡  represents time-specific 
effects; and the time-varying disturbance term μ k,t  is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero and 
variance σ2. The vector of explanatory variables, X, includes k factors (k= 1,…,9). These are measures of (i) 
capital market development, (ii) banking development, (iii) economic growth, (iv) divid end payment, (v) 
industry risk, (vi) leverage, (vii) size, (viii) growth opportunities, and (ix) financial crisis. 
Capital market development and banking development are respectively the total value of all listed 
shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP and domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage 
of GDP (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan1). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for 
Taiwan. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551. Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of 
earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). Leverage is 
total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). Growth opportunities is 
market-to book. Market-to-book is defined as total liabilities (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), 
deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total 
assets.   
 
2.3.  Data 
 
The data extracted from Worldscope include firms from 50 countries: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the 
UK, the US, and Vietnam.   
                                                                 
1 Data was obtained consolidating the figures available on Taiwan Stock Exchange, Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics  and The Central Bank of China, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the 
Republic of China and CEIC. 
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The sample is diversified with 40.917 firms and 336.318 observations, covering emerging capital 
markets, namely the largest, such as Mexico and Brazil; several developed capital markets, such as the UK and 
the US; diverse banking-oriented countries, including France and Germany; countries with different levels of 
investor protection, such as Indonesia and New Zealand; and countries whose economies show different levels 
of economic growth, such as China and Greece (see Table 1).   
Data cover the period from 1995 to 2014. All firm-level variables are winsorized, excluding the 
bottom and the top 1% of the own variable distribution. Also financial institutions and utilities are excluded  
due the regulamentary rules they are subject to.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The average retained earnings by country varies from 3% (Greece, Hong Kong and Jordan) and 8% 
(Argentina, Denmark, Peru, Russian Federation and Switzerland).  
Concerning to firm variables the results are heterogeneous; firms from Portugal, Pakistan and Greece 
present, in average, the highest value for debt to assets ratio (0.32); on the opposite side are Romania and Egypt 
(0.16); the largest firms, in average, are located in Netherlands, Mexico and Spain. Bulgaria, Jordan, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam and Romania present the smallest firms; while firms in China, Sweden, the United States and Saudi 
Arabia present the highest market-to-book, the opposite can be observed in Romania, Bulgaria, and Portugal; 
in Egypt, Finland, Japan and Chile firms often pay dividends, contrarily to Bulgaria, Romania, United States 
and Canada where firms do not pay regularly dividends.  
Regarding to country variables, and specifically to banking development Japan, the United States, 
Spain, Denmark and Canada provide the largest infrastructure; Saudi Arabia, Peru, Argentina and Oman, on 
the contrary, present a reduced banking development; in relation to capital market development, Romania, 
Argentina, Vietnam and Bulgaria present the lowest percentages for the relation between market capitalization  
to GDP; on the contrary, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland and Hong Kong present the highest; in relation  
to economic growth, China, India, Sri Lanka and Vietnam were the winners during the period 1995-2014;  
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Japan were on the opposite side. 
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3. Results 
 
Table 2 presents the retained earnings and abnormal retained earnings by country. The results diverge 
significantly around the world. Among the countries that retain less results (4%, or less of the asset value) we 
can find countries like Greece, Hong Kong, Jordania, Brazil, Bulgaria, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Romania and 
Sweden. On the other side, firms in Switzerland, South Africa, Russia, Peru, The Netherlands, Denmark and 
Argentina retain more results. In these countries, on average, firms retain nearly 8% of the total assets . In other 
words, on average, the firms duplicate the value of their assets in a space frame of approximately 12.5 years 
only with income retention. This result explains the importance of internal finance. Beck et al (2008) only 
found 13 countries, on a sample of 48, which firms´ external funds represent more than 50% of their financing.  
With regard to the results of the abnormal retained earnings  we have to negatively highlight Greece, 
Hong Kong, Jordania, Sweden, Brazil, Bulgaria, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Romania, Canada, Chile, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In a general way, with statistical significance, the 
companies of these countries, on average, present negative abnormal retained earnings. The firms in South 
Africa, Russia and Peru, are on average the ones that show a higher level of abnormal retained earnings on a 
global scale (near to 3%). With these results it is difficult to establish a pattern in order to identify easily the 
factors that determine the firms abnormal retained earnings. We are in the presence of countries with a different  
level of financial development and economic growth, as well as with opposite legal framework and with  
different financial infrastructures.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
However, considering the development of the financial sector (developed capital markets vs emerging  
capital markets) and the legal structures (common law based vs civil law based), in contrast to the results 
obtained previously, it is possible to draw conclusions . The firms located in countries with emerging capital 
markets, as shown in the following figure, show, on average, higher abnormal retained results than firms  
located in developed capital markets. The same pattern of behaviour takes place when comparing firms which  
have common law systems opposed to firms facing a civil law based system. In this case, common law based 
firms retain more abnormal earnings. If the first outcome was the expected, it cannot be said about the second. 
Generally the common law based countries are better equipped in terms of external sources of financing, since 
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as a result of the legal framework and due to the fact of investors being more protected, the access ibility to 
external funding is easier to them (La Porta et al (1997, 1998) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)). 
More surprising was the result obtained for the United States compared to the four categories of countries.  
After the financial crisis of 2008, the north-american companies, on average, showed an abnormally high level 
of abnormal earning retention. This result is unexpected once the US firms are located in a country where the 
access to external financing is relatively easy. We suspect that is due to higher needs of investment of north-
american firms. We also suspect the same with regard to firms placed on common law countries as opposed to 
civil law based ones.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Abnormal Retained Earnings Around the World 
 
  
Table 3 presents an univariate analysis comparing the retained earnings and the abnormal retained 
earnings of emerging capital markets with developed capital markets, as well as civil law countries with  
common law-based countries. The analysis also evaluates  both variables before and after the financial crisis.  
 The results confirm that the firms located in emerging capital markets, on average, retain more results 
(+0.34%) and present higher abnormal retained results (+0.68%) than firms established in markets with  
developed capitals. Simultaneously, the standard deviation of the retained and abnormal retained earnings is 
lower for firms located in emerging capital capitals. This confirms the need of companies located in these 
markets to resort to internal funds in a systematic way given their financial infrastructure. 
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 Also, as referred before, the results shown in table 3 confirm that, on average, common law based 
countries show a higher level of earnings retention (0.60%) and of abnormal earning retention (+0.37%) than 
civil law based countries. However, the standard deviation of both variables is higher in common law based 
countries. The results obtained before and after the financial crisis turned the retained and abnormal retained 
earnings even more divergent: firms on common law based countries retained more earnings compared to firms  
placed on civil law based countries.  
  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
   
 
Table 4 studies firm and country-level determinants of abnormal retained earnings, using a panel of 
random and fixed firm effects.  Capital market development, banking development and GDP growth are used 
as country-level determinants, industry risk, and dividend dummy, debt to assets, size and market -to-book are 
firm-level. A dummy for the financial crisis of 2008 is also considered as independent variable. The Hausman 
test suggests the use of fixed effects. However, in order to give robustness to the results, the panels of random 
and fixed effects are presented. 
In relative terms, regarding the country variables it must be stressed the positive impact of GDP on 
abnormal retained earnings, independently of using random or fixed effects . This seems to indicate that firms  
retain more results as the economy grows in order to provide a larger set of opportunities of investment. 
Concerning the other two institutional variables, capital market development and banking development, the 
results are ambiguous.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
With regard to the firm variables the results are more uniform. The firms that operate within riskier 
industries, where cash flow varies more, present higher abnormal retained earnings . This result responds to the 
assumption formulated that the firms which generate more cash flow retain more profit, as the internal funds 
are the source of a more economic financing (Myers (1984). At the same time, firms that regularly pay 
dividends retain less results. A possible explanation for what happened is formulated in the traditional problem 
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of conflict between managers and shareholders. Firms retain less results to avoid managers using cash flow in 
a discretionary way for their interest. The hypothesis that companies with a higher leverage show a lower level 
of retained results has been equally validated. The size parameter of the firms shows a positive sign. This means 
that the larger firms retain higher abnormal earnings. This result is apparently controversial as there is vast 
literature which concludes that firms of smaller size show more financial constraints , which means they use 
less external finance (Beck et al (2005, 2008) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006)). 
 However, these results only tell us that small firms proportionally use less external finance to face 
their needs of investment given their lower capacity to obtain external financing. Our results, on the contrary, 
and in line with MacAnBhaird and Lucey (2010), show that as firms grow, they present higher abnormal 
retained earnings. With regard to the growth opportunities, as expected, the results indicate that firms with  
these characteristics present higher abnormal results. The parameter that compares the period before and after 
of the financial crisis of 2008 shows a negative sign. Apparently, the retained results of the firms decreased 
after that event.  
In table 5 there are a number of regressions presented about abnormal retained earnings by group of 
countries: emerging capital markets, developed capital markets, civil law based countries and the USA. The 
results, in general, confirm what was obtained of table 4, namely: the signs of the parameters of the firms ´ 
variables; the less consensual findings for country variables. Several research papers about financing choices 
found identical results (Booth el al (2001), Gianetti (2003) and Öztekin (2015)); the positive impact of 
economic growth on abnormal retained earnings; with the financial crisis of 2008, firms, with the exception of 
north American companies, presented less abnormal retained earnings ; capital market development and 
banking development also seem to have a negative impact in the abnormal retained earnings. This seems to 
meet the idea that given lower financial constraints, meaning an easier external financing, firms resort less to 
internal financing.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In table 6 a robustness test to the previous results is presented using a dynamic panel data model with 
country effects, recurring to the generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano–Bond (1991). The 
variables are measured by country. We also calculate the Sargan test to evaluate over-identifying restrictions. 
In all regressions is accepted the absence of correlation between instruments and also between the residuals 
and instruments. We note that there is no second-order autocorrelation of errors for difference equation, 
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because the test of second order autocorrelation (AR2) does not allow rejecting the hypothesis of absence of 
second-order autocorrelation.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results do not support the hypothesis that firms located on countries with a larger financial 
infrastructure (small capital market and banking sector) recur less to internal financing. However, the same 
cannot be said about economic growth, where results support what was shown in tables 4 and 5, as the higher 
growth rate of an economy shows higher growth rates, the firms seek more internal financing. The firms ´ 
variables confirm the signs previously detected. With regard to the period after the financial crisis of 2008 there 
are no evident signals that the firms have moved to have positive abnormal retained earnings, contrary to what 
should be expected about financial constraints data placed by financial infrastructures .   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The financial economy has given more emphasis to external financing than to internal financing. However, it 
is the latter that firms generally seek. In this work the evolution of internal financing is analyzed in different  
geographical points.  
The results of our work indicate that firms located in emerging markets use more internal financing  
than firms of developed countries. This result was expected as the financial infrastructure of the first is less 
sophisticated and of a lower dimension, not allowing companies to have an easily access to external financing. 
Nevertheless, the same cannot be said about common law based countries towards civil law based ones, where 
the first generally present larger financial infrastructures . In these countries, despite of having an easier access 
to external financing, they retain earnings above the expected and higher than civil law based countries. A 
possible explanation, according to our results, can be seen in the economic growth that these countries have 
shown in the past 20 years. The financial crisis of 2008 and its impact in the abnormal retained earnings can 
help to validate partially this result.  
Concerning the determinants of abnormal retained earnings our results show a consensual role of firm-
level variables in comparison to country-level variables. In this regard, we would like to draw attention upon 
the impact of the firms´ size on abnormal retained earnings. According to our results this relationship is 
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positive. This strongly questions the growth of smaller companies. Despite their financial constraints in terms  
of external finance they present lower abnormal retained earnings. It is a matter that deserves definitely more 
in-depth research in the future.  
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics of Firm-Level and Country-Level Variables 
Retained earnings (RE) are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 
01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) and cash dividends paid (WC 04551) divided by 
total assets (WC 02999). E(RE) are expected retained earnings and it is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector. Industry risk 
is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to tota l assets 
(wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth 
opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilit ies (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), 
convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551. BD 
is banking development and is defined as domestic credit provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP (source: World Bank,  except 
for Taiwan). CMD is capital market development and is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan.  Firms and N are the 
number of firms and observations, respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. 
Country RE E(RE) IndRisk D/A SIZE MtB 
Dividend 
D 
BD CMD 
GDP 
GROWTH 
Firms N 
ARGENTINA 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.18 11.61 1.26 0.45 0.29 0.15 0.06 68 548 
AUSTRIA 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.24 12.48 1.32 0.69 1.26 0.26 0.02 124 1.010 
BELGIUM 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.24 12.52 1.51 0.63 1.12 0.65 0.02 154 1.310 
BRAZIL 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.29 12.43 1.40 0.63 0.87 0.51 0.03 390 2.472 
BULGARIA 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.18 8.84 1.03 0.27 0.58 0.20 0.03 194 1.285 
CANADA 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.21 10.87 1.66 0.31 1.84 1.09 0.02 2.287 13.766 
CHILE 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.21 11.71 1.21 0.84 0.90 1.02 0.04 158 1.739 
CHINA 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.21 12.18 1.93 0.69 1.47 0.47 0.09 2.516 11.463 
DENMARK 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.25 11.81 1.57 0.59 1.85 0.53 0.01 217 2.061 
EGYPT 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.16 10.87 1.54 0.74 0.82 0.49 0.04 138 911 
FINLAND 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.24 12.51 1.60 0.80 1.00 1.13 0.02 159 1.734 
FRANCE 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.22 12.29 1.48 0.61 1.21 0.76 0.02 1.087 8.631 
GERMANY 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.20 12.17 1.56 0.50 1.37 0.46 0.01 1.018 8.460 
GREECE 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.33 11.35 1.15 0.58 1.21 0.43 -0.01 323 2.297 
HONG KONG 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.19 11.37 1.34 0.53 1.63 7.57 0.04 970 11.216 
INDIA 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.31 10.88 1.39 0.64 0.67 0.77 0.07 2.235 18.996 
INDONESIA 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.31 11.15 1.39 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.05 362 4.241 
IRELAND 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.23 12.41 1.70 0.61 1.49 0.57 0.05 90 777 
ISRAEL 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.28 11.18 1.37 0.35 0.86 0.78 0.04 421 3.048 
ITALY 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.27 12.66 1.31 0.59 1.24 0.40 0.00 311 2.784 
JAPAN 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.23 12.77 1.16 0.85 3.21 0.75 0.01 4.401 46.453 
JORDAN 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.17 9.12 1.35 0.35 1.08 1.06 0.05 151 926 
KOREA (SOUTH) 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.25 11.81 1.13 0.59 1.46 1.42 0.04 1.820 17.875 
KUWAIT 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.22 11.17 1.30 0.64 0.65 1.16 0.03 94 660 
MALAYSIA 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.22 10.77 1.13 0.60 1.30 1.41 0.05 1.086 12.087 
MEXICO 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.24 13.10 1.28 0.46 0.36 0.29 0.03 146 1.572 
NETHERLANDS 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.23 13.14 1.69 0.65 1.65 0.99 0.02 249 2.377 
NEW ZEALAND 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.22 11.06 1.66 0.70 1.31 0.35 0.03 144 1.240 
NORWAY 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.29 11.79 1.61 0.44 0.78 0.50 0.02 309 2.187 
OMAN 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.25 10.18 1.40 0.60 0.34 0.46 0.04 84 580 
PAKISTAN 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.33 10.82 1.28 0.69 0.44 0.22 0.04 189 2.197 
PERU 0.08 0.05 0.15 0.21 11.25 1.23 0.54 0.20 0.41 0.05 108 910 
PHILIPPINES 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.20 10.41 1.37 0.43 0.52 0.55 0.05 182 1.983 
POLAND 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.17 11.22 1.40 0.36 0.56 0.31 0.04 364 2.799 
PORTUGAL 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.34 12.04 1.12 0.58 1.44 0.39 0.02 100 834 
ROMANIA 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.15 9.98 0.97 0.28 0.39 0.12 0.03 121 852 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.26 12.60 1.22 0.33 0.35 0.51 0.03 398 1.669 
SAUDI ARABIA 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.20 12.19 2.26 0.70 0.18 0.64 0.05 93 649 
SINGAPORE 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.20 11.27 1.23 0.64 0.82 2.08 0.06 708 7.307 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.17 11.75 1.48 0.63 1.74 1.96 0.03 554 4.152 
SPAIN 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.29 12.97 1.53 0.65 1.91 0.90 0.01 176 1.092 
SRI LANKA 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.22 9.44 1.39 0.65 0.45 0.25 0.06 142 1.183 
SWEDEN 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.17 11.29 1.92 0.52 1.29 0.90 0.02 566 4.357 
SWITZERLAND 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.21 12.86 1.67 0.70 1.66 2.11 0.02 258 2.896 
TAIWAN 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.22 11.50 1.38 0.56 1.45 1.41 0.05 1.693 17.493 
THAILAND 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.28 11.09 1.27 0.67 1.30 0.65 0.04 511 5.899 
TURKEY 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.22 11.83 1.43 0.38 0.64 0.32 0.05 243 2.035 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.17 11.41 1.76 0.63 1.54 1.25 0.02 2.812 20.414 
UNITED STATES 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.23 12.17 1.97 0.30 2.07 1.26 0.03 9.399 69.420 
VIETNAM 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.25 9.78 1.16 0.59 1.07 0.21 0.06 594 3.471 
Total 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.23 11.79 1.51 0.55 1.68 1.22 0.03 40.917 336.318 
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Table 2 – Retained Earnings and Abnormal Retained Earnings by Country  
Retained earnings (RE) are retained earnings. Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data 
item WC 01651) plus depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) and cash 
dividends paid (WC 04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). ARE are abnormal retained earnings and compares the firms´ retained 
earnings with its expected value. The expected retained earnings is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by secto r.   
Country 
RE  S´RE p-value 
 
ARE  S´ARE p-value 
ARGENTINA 0,08 0,10 0,00 0,02 0,10 0,00 
AUSTRIA 0,07 0,08 0,00 0,01 0,08 0,01 
BELGIUM 0,07 0,09 0,00 0,02 0,09 0,00 
BRAZIL 0,04 0,10 0,00 -0,01 0,10 0,00 
BULGARIA 0,04 0,09 0,00 -0,01 0,10 0,01 
CANADA 0,05 0,14 0,00 -0,01 0,14 0,02 
CHILE 0,05 0,07 0,00 -0,01 0,07 0,02 
CHINA 0,05 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,47 
DENMARK 0,08 0,11 0,00 0,02 0,11 0,00 
EGYPT 0,06 0,07 0,00 0,01 0,07 0,02 
FINLAND 0,07 0,09 0,00 0,01 0,09 0,00 
FRANCE 0,06 0,09 0,00 0,01 0,09 0,09 
GERMANY 0,06 0,11 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,41 
GREECE 0,03 0,08 0,00 -0,03 0,08 0,00 
HONG KONG 0,03 0,11 0,00 -0,02 0,11 0,00 
INDIA 0,07 0,08 0,00 0,01 0,08 0,00 
INDONESIA 0,06 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,12 
IRELAND 0,06 0,12 0,00 0,01 0,11 0,12 
ISRAEL 0,04 0,11 0,00 -0,01 0,11 0,00 
ITALY 0,04 0,08 0,00 -0,01 0,08 0,00 
JAPAN 0,05 0,06 0,00 -0,01 0,06 0,00 
JORDAN 0,03 0,08 0,00 -0,02 0,08 0,00 
KOREA (SOUTH) 0,05 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,12 
KUWAIT 0,06 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,15 
MALAYSIA 0,04 0,08 0,00 -0,01 0,08 0,00 
MEXICO 0,06 0,07 0,00 0,01 0,07 0,03 
NETHERLANDS 0,08 0,10 0,00 0,02 0,10 0,00 
NEW ZEALAND 0,05 0,11 0,00 -0,01 0,11 0,03 
NORWAY 0,05 0,12 0,00 -0,01 0,12 0,07 
OMAN 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,02 0,07 0,00 
PAKISTAN 0,07 0,08 0,00 0,01 0,08 0,00 
PERU 0,08 0,09 0,00 0,03 0,09 0,00 
PHILIPPINES 0,06 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,10 0,39 
POLAND 0,06 0,10 0,00 0,01 0,10 0,00 
PORTUGAL 0,05 0,07 0,00 -0,01 0,07 0,03 
ROMANIA 0,04 0,10 0,00 -0,01 0,10 0,01 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 0,08 0,10 0,00 0,03 0,10 0,00 
SAUDI ARABIA 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,01 0,07 0,00 
SINGAPORE 0,05 0,09 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,20 
SOUTH AFRICA 0,08 0,11 0,00 0,03 0,11 0,00 
SPAIN 0,06 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,34 
SRI LANKA 0,06 0,07 0,00 0,01 0,07 0,03 
SWEDEN 0,04 0,14 0,00 -0,02 0,14 0,00 
SWITZERLAND 0,08 0,10 0,00 0,02 0,10 0,00 
TAIWAN 0,05 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,36 
THAILAND 0,06 0,09 0,00 0,01 0,09 0,01 
TURKEY 0,05 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,41 
UNITED KINGDOM 0,05 0,13 0,00 -0,01 0,13 0,03 
UNITED STATES 0,07 0,15 0,00 0,01 0,15 0,06 
VIETNAM 0,07 0,08 0,00 0,02 0,08 0,00 
All 0,06 0,11 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,50 
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Table 3 - Univariate Analysis by Category of Country 
RE and ARE are retained earnings and abnormal retained earnings. S´RE and S´ARE are respectively the standard deviation of retained earnings 
and abnormal retained earnings. The sample is divided considering the instabilit ies that occurred in world markets during the 
global financial crisis that began in 2008. Nº OBS are the number of observations. 
All 
  RE ARE 𝑆′  RE 𝑆´ ARE 
Emerging Capital Markets 5.83% 0.47% 8.49% 8.43% 
Nº OBS 102.772 
Developed Capital Markets 5.49% -0.21% 11.70% 11.58% 
Nº OBS 233.546 
Emerging vs Developed Capital Markets  0.34% 0.68% 0.53 0.53 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Civil Law based Countries 5.29% -0.19% 8.55% 8.48% 
Nº OBS 164.616 
Common Law based Countries 5.88% 0.18% 12.61% 12.50% 
Nº OBS 171.702 
Civil Law vs Common Law based Countries  -0.60% -0.37% 0.46 0.46 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Before Crisis 
Emerging Capital Markets 6.44% 0.58% 8.93% 8.88% 
Nº OBS 45.155 
Developed Capital Markets 5.85% -0.18% 11.90% 11.77% 
Nº OBS 145.611 
Emerging vs Developed Capital Markets  0.59% 0.75% 0.56 0.57 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
After Crisis 
Emerging Capital Markets 5.34% 0.39% 8.09% 8.45% 
Nº OBS 57.617 
Developed Capital Markets 4.89% -0.25% 11.34% 11.27% 
Nº OBS 87.935 
Emerging vs Developed Capital Markets  0.45% 0.64% 0.51 0.50 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Before Crisis 
Civil Law based Countries 5.72% -0.15% 8.62% 8.53% 
Nº OBS 84.115 
Common Law based Countries 6.21% 0.12% 12.98% 12.85% 
Nº OBS 106.651 
Civil Law vs Common Law based Countries  -0.49% -0.26% 0.44 0.44 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
After Crisis 
Civil Law based Countries 4.84% -0.24% 8.46% 8.42% 
Nº OBS 80.501 
Common Law based Countries 5.36% 0.29% 11.96% 11.90% 
Nº OBS 65.051 
Civil Law vs Common Law based Countries  -0.52% -0.52% 0.50 0.50 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
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Table 4 - Panel Regression of Abnormal Retained Earnings by firm  
Panel regressions report random and firm fixed-effects. Dependent variable is abnormal retained earnings (ARE). Retained earnings (RE) 
are retained earnings. Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651)  plus 
depreciation (WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) and cash dividends paid (WC 
04551) divided by total assets (WC 02999). ARE compares the firms  ´retained earnings with its expected value. The expected re tained 
earnings is the firms  ´annual average retained earnings by sector.  Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before 
interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total asset s (wc 02999). 
Size are firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilit ies (WC 03351), 
preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by 
total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551 (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). 
GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. Observations and firms are the number of observations and firms, 
respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. Statistical inference based on cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. 
  All Before Crisis After Crisis 
VARIABLES FE RE FE RE FE RE 
CMD  t   -0.0017   -0.0130   -0.0030   -0.0024    0.0021    - 0.0011 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
BD  t  0.0003   -0.0014  -0.0048   -0.0169  -0.0029  -0.0114 
p-value  (0.77)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH  t  0.0262  0.0550  0.0181  0.0789  0.0259  0.0535 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
IndRisk  t  0.1369  0.0529  0.1457  0.0500  0.2416  0.0550 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Dividend D t  -0.0030   0.0031  -0.0090  0.0025  -0.0086   0.0010 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.14) 
D/A t  -0.1079  -0.0901  -0.1146  -0.0880  -0.1203  -0.0890 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE  t  0.0210  0.0176  0.0211  0.0179  0.0248  0.0157 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
MtB t  0.0118  0.0100  0.0126  0.0101  0.0102  0.0088 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
CrisisD  t   -0.0088   -0.0031       
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)         
Constant  -0.2555  -0.1925  -0.2494  -0.1896  -0.3099  -0.1696 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 336.318 336.318 190.766 190.766 145.552 145.552 
Firms 40.917 40.917 35.327 35.327 28.682 28.682 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Hausman Test 2808.76 1897.81 1605.19 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
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Table 5 - Panel Regression of Abnormal Retained Earnings  
Panel regressions report firm fixed-effects. Dependent variable is abnormal retained earnings (ARE). Retained earnings (RE) are retained 
earnings. Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation 
(WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) and cash div idends paid (WC 04551) divided 
by total assets (WC 02999). ARE compares the firms´ retained earnings with its expected value. The expected retained earnings is the 
firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector.  Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector of earnings before interest and 
depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc 02999). Size are 
firms´ sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total liabilities (WC 03351), preferred 
stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capitalization (wc08001) divided by total assets. 
Dividend dummy results from WC 04551 (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP 
Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. Observations and firms are the number of observations and firms, respectively. 
Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. Statistical inference based on cluster-robust standard errors at the firm level. 
VARIABLES 
Emerging 
Markets 
Developed 
Markets 
Civil Law based 
Countries 
Common Law 
based Countries 
USA 
CMD  t   -0.0102   -0.0015   -0.0153   -0.0012    0.0110 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
BD  t    -0.0084    -0.0036    -0.0084    -0.0023    -0.0436 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.14)  (0.00) 
GDPGROWTH  t   0.0363   0.0416   0.0366   0.0403   0.0957 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
IndRisk  t  0.2852  0.0718  0.2114 0.0813  0.0237 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.37) 
Dividend D t    -0.0061    -0.0008  -0.0051  -0.0005  -0.0059 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.25)  (0.00) (0.55)  (0.00) 
D/A t  -0.1275  -0.0999  -0.1259  -0.0982  -0.0916 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE  t  0.0154  0.0243  0.0179 0.0231  0.0378 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
MtB t   0.0136   0.0119  0.0139 0.0111  0.0144 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) 
CrisisD  t   -0.0114   -0.0056   -0.0099  -0.0085    0.0012 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.48) 
Constant  -0.1732  -0.2911  -0.2348  -0.2664  -0.3861 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102.772 233.546 164.616 171.702 69.420 
R2  0.10  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
Table 6 – Dynamic Panel Regression of Abnormal Retained Earnings  
All variables are annual means by country. Dependent variable is abnormal retained earnings (ARE). Retained earnings (RE) are retained 
earnings. Retained earnings are defined as net income before preferred dividends (Worldscope data item WC 01651) plus depreciation 
(WC 01151) minus common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted, and others (WC 04751) and cash dividends paid (WC 04551) divided 
by total assets (WC 02999). ARE are abnormal retained earnings and compares the firms´ retained earnings with its expected value. The 
expected retained earnings is the firms´ annual average retained earnings by sector.  Industry risk is the yearly standard deviation by sector 
of earnings before interest and depreciations and amortizations (wc 18198) to total assets (wc02999). DA is total debt (wc03255) to total 
assets (wc 02999). Size are firms  ´sales (wc07240). MtB is market-to book (growth opportunities). Market-to-book is defined as total 
liabilit ies (WC 03351), preferred stock (WC 03451), deferred taxes (WC 03263), convertible debt (WC 18282) and market capital ization 
(wc08001) divided by total assets. Dividend dummy results from WC 04551 (source: World Bank, except for Taiwan). (source: World 
Bank, except for Taiwan). GDP Growth source is also from World Bank, except for Taiwan. Observations and countries are the number 
of observations and countries, respectively. Sample period is from 1995 to 2014. Statistical inference based on cluster-robust standard 
errors at the country level. AR(2) test is a test for the second-order serial correlation, and is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test for the validity of instruments and is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of 
valid instruments. 
VARIABLES Crisis Country Firm  All 
ARE t-1 0.4092 0.4207 0.4089 0.4075 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CMD  t  0.0058  0.0019 
p-value  (0.18)  (0.00) 
BD  t  0.0071  0.0089 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.02) 
GDPGROWTH  t  0.0543  0.0241 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.08) 
IndRisk  t   0.0923 0.1170 
p-value   (0.01) (0.00) 
Dividend D t   -0.0558 -0.0537 
p-value   (0.00) (0.00) 
D/A t   -0.1906 -0.1819 
p-value   (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE  t   0.0142 0.0140 
p-value   (0.00) (0.00) 
MtB t   0.0070 0.0048 
p-value   (0.00) (0.00) 
CrisisD  t -0.0064   -0.0003 
p-value (0.00)   (0.81) 
Constant 0.0037 -0.0109 - 0.1113 - 0.1253 
p-value (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 760 760 760 760 
Number of Countries 50 50 50 50 
AR (2) test 0,78 0.98 0.93 1.02 
p-value (0.44) (0.17) (0.35) (0.31) 
Sargan test 14.11 18.42 12.20 13,10 
p-value (0.66) (0.36) (0.21) (0.27) 
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